Abstract- We study Colonel Blotto games with sequential battles and a majoritarian objective. For a large class of contest success functions, the equilibrium is unique and characterized by an even split: Each battle that is reached before one of the players wins a majority of battles is allocated the same amount of resources from the player's overall budget. As a consequence, a player's chance of winning any particular battle

is independent of the battlefield and of the number of victories and losses the player accumulated in prior battles. This result is in stark contrast to equilibrium behavior in sequential contests that do not involve either  fixed budgets or a majoritarian objective. We also consider the equilibrium choice of an overall budget. For many contest success functions, if the sequence of battles is long enough the payoff  structure

in this extended games resembles an all-pay auction without noise.

Bio- Kai A. Konrad is Director at the MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance in Munich and a Scientific Member of the Max Planck Society. He is a Co-editor of the Journal of Public Economics.  He is a member of the German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina. He is a member of the Council of Scientific Advisors to the Federal Ministry of Finance and was the chairperson of this Council from 2011-2014. His research is on governance issues within groups and between groups.