Abstract- In settings with uncertainty, tension exists between ex ante and ex post notions of fairness (e.g., equal opportunity versus equal outcomes). In a laboratory experiment, the most common behavioral pattern is for subjects to select the ex ante fair alternative ex ante, and switch to the ex post fair alternative ex post. One potential explanation embraces consequentialism and construes the reversals as manifestations of time inconsistency. Another abandons consequentialism, thereby avoiding the implication that revisions imply inconsistency. We test between these explanations by examining the demand for commitment and contingent planning. The hypothesis of time-consistent non-consequentialism receives stronger support.

Bio- A native of California, Professor Naecker earned his undergraduate degree in physics and economics from the University of California, Berkeley, graduating with highest honors. He obtained his Ph.D. in economics from Stanford University in 2015, where he won the Centennial Award for his work as a teaching assistant in graduate game theory. His teaching at Wesleyan includes a core course on microeconomics and field courses on behavioral and experimental economics. Professor Naecker's research is primarily in the fields of behavioral and experimental economics. He studies the motivations behind prosocial behavior, the usefulness of hypothetical and subjective data in predicting incentivized choice, and how machine learning can add new insights to behavioral models of preferences.