Friday20Apr 2018

Jordan Bable - Accounting Speaker

How Do Investors React to Corporate Political Spending Disclosure?

Friday, April 20, 2018 11:00 a.m. - 12:15 p.m. PST
2018-04-20 11:00 2018-04-20 12:15 America/Los_Angeles Jordan Bable - Accounting Speaker Go to event listing for more details: https://events.chapman.edu/48286 BK 105 Beckman Hall 105 - Kennedy Classroom

Free to attend

Reservations are not required.

BK 105

Beckman Hall 105 - Kennedy Classroom

General Public

Everyone is welcome to attend

Prior to becoming an accounting academic, Jordan worked in retail investing for a regional bank and later served as an auditor for the U.S. Defense Contract Audit Agency. Now, as an assistant professor at the University of Waterloo in Waterloo, Ontario, he studies how the behaviors of managers, employees, and investors are influenced by different accounting-related stimuli such as internal communications, external disclosures, and compensation schemes. He recently defended his doctoral dissertation at the University of Pittsburgh and was a winner of the 2016 Deloitte Foundation Doctoral Fellowship Award.

Jordan will be presenting his paper - How Do Investors React to Corporate Political Spending Disclosure?

Abstract: In the ongoing debate over whether public companies should be required to disclose their political spending, one frequent argument against requiring disclosure is that investors do not consider political spending information relevant for their decisions. However, I predict and find in my experiment that investors whose political identities are aligned with a company’s political spending assess the company as more attractive and invest more in the company than investors whose political identities are misaligned with the political spending. Interestingly, this effect is primarily driven by the negative reactions of misaligned investors. The attractiveness assessments and investment amounts of misaligned investors are significantly lower than those of investors in a control condition with no political spending disclosure, but those of aligned investors are not significantly different from those in the control condition. My results also provide evidence that investors use political spending information consciously rather than because of a subconscious bias. These findings have implications for regulators because, contrary to the argument that political spending information is irrelevant to investors, my results suggest that investors consciously use political spending information in their investment decisions. In addition, my results extend existing theory in the finance literature that suggests investors have tastes for assets that are independent of financial considerations.

Link to paper: https://drive.google.com/file/d/17pTrgRWBOMR4O4dmxXo088fejxgeFOSv/view?usp=sharing

 

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